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Abstract
We review some of the (theoretical) economic implications of David Schmeidler's models
of decision under uncertainty (Choquet expected utility and maxmin expected utility) in
competitive market settings. We start with the portfolio inertia result of Dow and Werlang
(1992), show how it does or does not generalize in an equilibrium setting. We further
explore the equilibrium implications (indeterminacies, non revelation of information) of these
decision models. A section is then devoted to the studies of Pareto optimal arrangements
under these models. We conclude with a discussion of experimental evidence for these
models that relate, in particular, to the implications for market behaviour discussed in the
preceding sections.
Keywords. Choquet Expected Utility; Maxmin Expected Utility; No-trade; Risk Sharing;
Indeterminacy; Experimental evidence.
JEL Classication. D81
1 Introduction
David Schmeidler's seminal papers (Schmeidler (1982), Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989)) started a renewal of the way we think and model decision under uncertainty. The
decision theoretical literature that followed these advances is enormous and serves therefore to
measure the inuence of Schmeidler's ideas on microeconomic thought in the last forty years.
They also led to a substantial economic literature applying these new decision criteria to various
economic environments. One early, and now classic, application was a short paper by Dow and
Werlang (1992) that showed how (uncertainty averse) Choquet Expected Utility (henceforth
CEU) leads to the existence of a price interval at which a decision maker does not want to hold
a non-zero position on a particular asset whose payos are uncertain. This opened the way
to explore how populating our abstract economies with CEU maximizers or Maxmin Expected
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Utility (henceforth MEUalso known as the multiple prior model) agents aect the economic
outcomes, with a particular focus on risk sharing arrangements and asset pricing. Around the
same time David was coming up with the CEU model, other non linear models (Quiggin (1982),
Yaari (1987), Segal (1987), Bewley (1986), Weymark (1981), Chew (1983)) emerged. Some of
the economic consequences of CEU and MEU hypotheses are shared by these models but it is
fair to say that the main bulk of these applications was primarily motivated by David's work.
In this paper, we review this economic literature, which is mostly theoretical and has provided
new insights into the way markets allocate ambiguity. It does not aim at being exhaustive.1 For
instance, the more applied work, in particular in macro-nance, has lately followed mostly
another yet related route, namely applying the smooth ambiguity model of Klibano et al.
(2005) that is not reviewed here.
An important feature of the CEU and MEU models is that uncertainty aversion produces
a kink of the agent's indierence curve at the "certainty line". This non-dierentiability is, in
a way, a surprising outcome of the axiomatization of uncertainty averse behavior in Schmei-
dler (1982) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). It has a number of economic applications, such
as, portfolio inertia, equilibrium price indeterminacy, the absence of betting even under dis-
agreement. Interestingly, the non-dierentiability at certainty carries consequences away from
certainty as well. Actually, the notion of certainty has to be qualied since Schmeidler's analysis
is cast in the Anscombe-Aumann setting where a constant act is a lottery and thus inherently
stochastic. The economic literature, notably in a general equilibrium environment, has also pro-
gressively distinguished ambiguity from risk (of the endowment allocation in particular) and has
shown that this distinction is fruitful to explain, qualitatively, the kind of trading arrangement
one can expect under uncertainty aversion.
This review will start with the portfolio inertia phenomenon. We will then show that this
result is subject to fragilities when immersed in an equilibrium model. We will show thereafter
how the non dierentiability typical of the CEU and MEU models do produce new insights for
equilibrium and optimal risk sharing. Finally, a section on the experimental support for these
models (and more specically the non-dierentiability they induce) ends this review.
2 Portfolio inertia
In this section, we rst review the Dow and Werlang (1992) argument at the individual level,
how it can be extended and how it produces new insights in representative agent asset pricing
models. We also point to fragilities of the result and how the inertia property can be included
1For a more detailed survey focussed on ambiguity and asset markets, see Epstein and Schneider (2010), and
also Guidolin and Rinaldo (2013).
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in a general equilibrium setting with heterogeneous agents.
2.1 Portfolio inertia at the individual level
Following the publication of David's work on CEU and MEU hypotheses, a rst economic ap-
plication of these new decisions criteria was made by Dow and Werlang (1992). They showed
that, in a simple portfolio choice problem, ambiguity aversion leads to portfolio inertia. Recall
that, under expected utility, a decision maker is locally risk neutral and decides to short or
long an asset as soon as its price is above or below the expected return (Arrow (1965)). Under
MEU (or in the convex CEU case) this property is not satised anylonger if the decision maker's
initial position is riskless. The reason is that the "minimizing probability", that is, the prob-
ability that the decision maker ends up using (among all the distributions in his set of priors)
to evaluate the decision under consideration, when contemplating going short is dierent from
the minimizing probability distribution when going long. As it were, the "bad states" when
going short (in which the agent has to pay back a lot) become the "good states" if he were to
go long. As a result, there is an interval of prices at which it is optimal not to go short nor
long, leading to portfolio inertia: at the zero position, the optimal portfolio (i.e., holding zero
uncertain assets) is not responsive to price changes as long as they remain within the interval
identied. Chateauneuf and Ventura (2010) extend Dow and Werlang's original result within
the CEU model, showing it holds with possibly negative outcomes and under a weaker condi-
tion than convexity of the capacity. Higashi et al. (2008) explore further this inertia property
without assuming a particular decision model, and give an axiomatic foundation for the "kink
at certainty" property that underlies portfolio inertia.
The economic intuition behind this property of uncertainty averse behavior is straightfor-
ward: an uncertainty averse investor, who is not exposed to uncertainty, will require an extra
premium (compared to an uncertainty neutral investor) to move away from that situation and
include an asset with ambiguous payos in her portfolio. What the CEU and MEU add to this
is that the premium is of the rst order (does not vanish when the investment becomes small
whereas the risk premium does), reecting the non-dierentiability of the decision criterion.
This prediction of the MEU model leads to formulate a possible explanation to the well
documented puzzle of too little participation of individuals to the stock market. Based on the
intuition recalled above, non-participation would stem from the fact that uncertainty averse
individuals view stocks as ambiguous and thus require an extra premium (with, naturally a
higher premium the higher the uncertainty aversion) to hold them; thus, individuals who are
suciently uncertainty averse will prefer not to hold these stocks. Dimmock et al. (2016a) nds
evidence of this phenomenon in a report ran on a representative survey of US households.
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Note, the result carries over in the domain of risk, where Rank Dependent Utility (RDU
henceforth) functionals might exhibit the same inertia phenomenon (not surprisingly since from a
technical point of view, RDU can be seen as a particular case of CEU)which is thus compatible
with probabilistic sophistication. In the RDU model, rst order risk aversion is the explanation
of the fact that the overall premium required by the decision maker to hold the asset does not
vanish when holdings become small.
Portfolio inertia was also identied by Bewley (1986) as a consequence of incomplete prefer-
ences. The inertia identied in Dow and Werlang should however be distinguished from the one
exhibited by a decision maker with Bewley preferences. In the latter case, the inertia is built in
the decision model as a way to solve the conicting recommendations of dierent priors. Such
an inertia is the result of the incompleteness of the decision maker's preferences and is eective
essentially at any (initial) position. By contrast, in the simple Dow and Werlang example, if
the decision maker had an initial position in some other assets whose payos depend on the
same states as the one under consideration, the inertia property (i.e., the fact that there is a
non-degenerate interval of prices at which the decision maker does not want to go long nor
short) fails. An uncertainty averse agent will, in that situation, use the asset to hedge against
the uncertainty present in his initial endowments.
The inertia phenomenon that Dow and Werlang rst pointed out has been an important
feature of subsequent application of David's models of decision making under uncertainty. Soon
after Dow and Werlang's contribution, Epstein and Wang (1994) generalized this idea of portfolio
inertia beyond the simple static framework contemplated by Dow and Werlang. In their paper,
portfolio inertia induces volatility of asset prices and the possibility of sunspot equilibria. The
context is that of a Lucas tree model of asset pricing with a representative agent. At a kink of
the indierence curve, there exist multiple prices that support the initial endowment as a market
equilibrium. Thus, prices can change with no quantity change for instance; more precisely, two
states that have the same endowment can have dierent price associated to them. This was the
rst step towards an equilibrium analysis of the consequences of uncertainty averse behavior,
with the caveat that in a single-agent economy, there is no notion of trade.
Still in a representative agent framework, Epstein and Schneider (2008) explore how the
portfolio inertia exhibited by a MEU investor aects the way arrival of information induces
portfolio changes. They introduce two kinds of information. One is tangible (consists of past
dividends etc) and the other is intangible (consisting of news that is hard to quantify, such as
news reports for instance). The latter is thus ambiguous. Epstein and Schneider then show
that investors behave as if they overreact to bad intangible signals. This asymmetric response
to ambiguous information leads to skewness in returns. Furthermore, shocks to information
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quality can have persistent negative eects on prices even if fundamentals do not change.
Illeditsch (2011) builds on Epstein and Schneider (2008) along two dimensions: (i) investors
are risk-averse and (ii) investors receive stochastic labor income. The paper shows that the in-
teraction between risk and ambiguity leads to portfolio inertia for risky portfolios when investors
process ambiguous news (public information). When news is disappointing, investors can nd
risky stock allocations that hedge against ambiguous news. It is thus optimal to stick to these
allocations even if prices change. That paper thus helps explain why many investors who own
stocks do not show much trading activity.
Recently, Greinecker and Kuzmics (2019) showed that, if agents have to take decision in
the form of limit orders (i.e., deciding on how much to invest contingent on the realized price
of the asset), then ambiguity aversion does not produce results that can be distinguished from
standard expected utility maximization. The result rests on the observation that ambiguity
averse agents have a preference for randomization (built in the convex CEU and MEU criterion)
because the randomization allows them to hedge the ambiguity. A limit order is akin to a mixed
strategy since it is specifying an action contingent on a price that is ex ante stochastic. Thus,
an order buying below a certain price and selling above a dierent price, will be dominated by
a "mixture" which ends up specifying a single price above which one sells and below which one
buys. Thus, the (implicit) market structure in Dow and Werlangthat the agent observes the
price prior to making his portfolio decisionis also important for the inertia property.
While the portfolio inertia property attracted a lot of attention, moving from a single agent
analysis to an analysis of ambiguity sharing and equilibrium with dierent uncertainty averse
agents leads to new insights.
2.2 Portfolio inertia, market freeze and trade
The portfolio inertia property identied in the previous section could lead one to think that
uncertainty averse agents will end up trading very little. This intuition however has to be
rened, as market clearing conditions have some bite on what is feasible or not in terms of
trading and, in particular, whether agents can all achieve an allocation without ambiguity (i.e.,
a full insurance allocation). In a two-state, two-agent economy with MEU agents, it is easy to
see that, unless the endowments of the agents are both certainwhich implies that there cannot
be aggregate uncertaintythey will engage in some trade at equilibrium.
Chateauneuf et al. (2000) showed that the set of equilibrium allocations in an economy
consisting CEU agents (with identical convex capacities) is the same as that of an economy
populated by expected utility agents with identical beliefs. This, seemingly, limits the potential
for uncertainty aversion to account for and explain phenomena such as market freeze that have
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been intuitively associated with rises in uncertainty.
Easley and O'Hara (2009) provide such an equilibrium model of market non-participation,
or more precisely, an equilibrium model in which uncertainty averse agents (called naive agents)
decide not to hold any risky asset (which are all held by sophisticated investors). As such, and
as they recognize, this is dierent from a reduced amount of trading or "market freeze". Note,
regardless of their endowments, what ambiguity averse agents aim for is to have a nal asset
position that is as free of uncertainty as possible. So, in an equilibrium in which ambiguity-
averse investors choose not to hold a risky asset, they will trade, if necessary, in order to achieve
a zero asset position.
Mukerji and Tallon (2001) provide a simple general equilibrium model in which agents, in
order to share risk need to exchange ambiguous assets. More precisely, the asset payos depend
on the same states of nature as the agent's endowments. But they also carry some idiosyncratic
uncertainty which, crucially for the result, is ambiguous. If agents are suciently averse to that
uncertainty (modelled as having sets of beliefsin their model the core of a convex capacity
with higher (smaller) upper (lower) bound) then, they choose not to trade in these assets and
prefer to stay with their initial endowment. Therefore, assets that would be traded (for risk
sharing purposes) when agents are uncertainty neutral are not traded when agents are suciently
uncertainty averse. Mukerji and Tallon (2001) also show that the usual trick to get rid of asset
idiosyncratic risk, that is simple diversication strategies, does not work here. Indeed, replicating
these uncertain assets, each with its own idiosyncratic uncertainty, is not eective if agents are
suciently uncertainty averse. Related to this analysis, Mukerji and Tallon (2004a) provide an
argument explaining the fact that uncertainty averse agents might prefer to trade non-indexed
contracts rather than indexed assets. Quite intuitively, if relative prices are ambiguous in the
economy, indexed assets introduce some extra uncertainty into agents' portfolio and the ones
that are suciently uncertainty averse will shy away from this type of asset.2
Chateauneuf and de Castro (2011) provide the conditions under which more ambiguity aver-
sion implies less trade (in the sense of a smaller set of Pareto improving trades at any endow-
ment), for a class of preferences that includes CEU and MEU. The condition is that endowment
be unambiguous. The reduction in trade caused by ambiguity aversion can be as severe as to
lead to no-trade. In an economy with MEU decision makers, they show that if the aggregate
endowment is unanimously unambiguous then every Pareto optimal allocation is also unambigu-
ous.
These analysis can, as in the portfolio choice example of Section 2, be contrasted with what
happens in economies populated with agents with Bewley preferences. As Bewley (1986) already
2For a similar argument explaining the absence of wage indexation, see Mukerji and Tallon (2004b).
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noticed, the type of inertia stemming from his model of incomplete preferences and that coming
from Gilboa and Schmeidler's approach have dierent market implications: "Uncertainty aver-
sion [à la Bewley] could discourage insurance. [...] Even if endowments were very asymmetric
and preferences were the same, there might be no-trade in [equilibrium]. Nevertheless, the equi-
librium would be Pareto optimal. [...] [On the other hand], people with Gilboa-Schmeidler
preferences would be very apt to buy insurance."
Bewley's argument has been generalized by Rigotti and Shannon (2005) who study Pareto
optimal allocations and dene an equilibrium notion (equilibrium with inertia) applicable to
incomplete preferences. In a spirit similar to Mukerji and Tallon (2001), Rigotti and Shannon
(2005) also show that when there is uncertainty only about some events, there may be equilibria
in which securities contingent on these events are not traded, while securities contingent on the
remaining (risky) events are traded. In this case, a more limited degree of market incompleteness
is possible in equilibrium, in that risky securities are traded while uncertain securities are not.
Thus, whereas with incomplete preferences, absence of trade and insurance is somewhat built
in the model, it is not the case for ambiguity averse preferences à la (convex) CEU or MEU.
Conditions on how the endowments are perceived by the individuals are necessary to explain
absence of trade.
3 Equilibrium properties of economies populated with uncer-
tainty averse agents
In the previous section we reviewed some implications of the non-dierentiability of the CEU
and MEU preferences. In this section, we go further in this direction by studying the possibility
of equilibrium indeterminacies brought about by such non-dierentiability and review how this
can aect information revelation. We conclude the section by reviewing answers to what is,
essentially, a converse question: if the price functional is a Choquet functional, what can we
infer of the underlying market structure?
3.1 Indeterminacies
As recalled in Section 2.1, Epstein and Wang (1994) showed, in a representative agent frame-
work, that uncertainty averse behavior generates asset price indeterminacy at equilibrium.
Chateauneuf et al. (2000) and Dana (2004) compare equilibria in a convex CEU economy (with
identical capacities) and those of a vNM economy with identical beliefs. The equilibrium allo-
cations in the vNM economy do depend on beliefs, and it is not trivial to assess the relationship
between the equilibrium set of a vNM economy with identical beliefs and the equilibrium set
of the CEU economy. If aggregate endowments are dierent in all states of the world, then,
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equilibria of the CEU economy are the equilibria of the vNM economy with beliefs equal to
that probability distribution in the core of the capacity that is used to evaluate the aggregate
endowment. On the other hand, if there are some states with the same aggregate endowment,
it is a priori not possible to assimilate all the equilibria of the CEU economy with equilibria of
a given vNM economy. In particular, there might be a multiplicity of supporting prices. More
precisely, Dana (2004) shows that whenever there are several probabilities in the core of the
capacity that minimize the expected value of aggregate endowment and not all agents have the
same expected endowments under those probabilities, then equilibrium is indeterminate. As a
consequence, small changes in aggregate endowments might have drastic welfare implications.
Dana (2004) extends these results in innite dimensional economies.
These indeterminacies of equilibrium prices might thus appear to be non-robust to small per-
turbations in endowments, since equality of endowments across (some) states is needed. However,
Mandler (2013) argues that if agents are ambiguity-averse and can invest in productive assets,
asset prices can robustly exhibit indeterminacy in the markets that open after the productive
investment has been launched. Intuitively, if we leave the possibility to ambiguity averse agents
to aect through production the endowment they have in the second period, the technology that
allows to equate these endowments across states will have a premium, since such full insurance
is highly valued. They will thus invest in these assets and the endowment conguration in the
second period (the timing is more subtle: one needs to introduce an intermediate period at which
production is realized and agents can trade assets contingent on states in the second period)
will be precisely the one that produces price indeterminacies. Thus, as Mandler states "For
indeterminacy to occur, the aggregate supply of goods must appear in precise congurations but
the investment levels that generate endogenously these supplies arise systematically." Note that
the fact that indeterminacy arises only at a knife-edge set of aggregate supplies (that lead the
economy second period endowment to allow for full insurance of the agents) allows for a sim-
ple explanation of the volatility of asset prices: small changes in supplies in this neighborhood
necessarily lead to a big price response and thus extra volatility.
These results can again be contrasted with those obtained in a Bewley economy: Rigotti and
Shannon (2005) nd robust indeterminacies, for every initial endowment vector. Provided there
is sucient overlap in agents' beliefs, there is a continuum of equilibrium allocations and prices,
regardless of other features of agents' beliefs, initial endowments, or aggregate endowments.
They show, on the other hand, that despite such robust indeterminacies, the set of equilibria
varies continuously with the amount of uncertainty agents perceive. In particular, as uncertainty
goes to zero (that is, agents perceive only risk), the equilibrium correspondence converges to
an equilibrium of the economy in which there is only risk. Dana and Riedel (2013) generalize
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Rigotti and Shannon's static results to a dynamic economy.
3.2 Non-revelation of information
As uncertainty refers to situations where information is scarce, it is natural to investigate if
and how uncertainty aversion may interfere with the way privately held information spreads in
the economy. Tallon (1998) is an early investigation of this issue that shows that ambiguity
averse investors might buy "redundant" information even if the equilibrium is fully revealing.
This is possible if the investor has less faith in the information revealed by prices (possibly
because of model mis-specication) than in information privately acquired. Condie and Ganguli
(2011a) show that non-smooth ambiguity aversion, i.e., convex CEU or MEU, may lead to
informational ineciency: even in the absence of noise traders, private information might not
be fully revealed at a rational expectations equilibrium. The mechanism relies on the fact that
non-smooth uncertainty aversion implies that investor demand does not change with information
(i.e., beliefs) for some range of parameters. This feature of preferences then can be used to
construct a non-revealing equilibrium. Intuitively, if a privately informed investor is uncertainty
averse, an allocation that fully insures him might be optimal for him (at a given price) for
dierent beliefs, due to the non-dierentiability in his preferences. Hence, no matter what signal
he received, that allocation and associated price is an equilibrium; the information received does
not get to be revealed. Note that, while based on the non-smoothness of indierence curves,
the mechanism is not exactly the same as the one involved in the portfolio inertia of Dow and
Werlang (1992). Condie and Ganguli (2011b) complement this nding by showing that fully
revealing equilibria also exist in these economies and Condie and Ganguli (2017) further explore
the pricing implication of this informational ineciency. In a similar vein, Condie et al. (2017)
study how aversion to ambiguity about the predictability of future asset values and cash ows
aects optimal portfolios and asset prices. They show that investors' portfolios do not always
react to new information, even away from full insurance. The equilibrium price of the market
portfolio does not always incorporate all available public information, in particular it might
fail to incorporate bad news. This informational ineciency leads to price underreaction. The
economic mechanism that leads to this "information inertia" does not occur at the kink in
investors' utility in contrast to the portfolio inertia previously discussed.
The asset pricing implication of ambiguous information have also been explored by Ozsoylev
and Werner (2011). They show that ambiguous information gives rise to the possibility of
illiquid market where arbitrageurs choose not to trade in a rational expectations equilibrium.
As a consequence of this illiquidity, small informational or supply shocks have relatively large
eects on asset prices. Mele and Sangiorgi (2015) analyze costly information acquisition in asset
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markets characterized by ambiguity. They show how uncertainty aversion aects the incentives
to acquire information and can lead to the existence of multiple equilibria which in turn can
account for large price swings event after small changes in ambiguity.3 These investors prefer
to trade on aggregate signals if those reduce ambiguity, even if it is at the cost of a loss in
information. This feature of ambiguity averse investors might explain both under-reaction to
overall news and, concurrently, overreaction to specic components of the overall news.
3.3 CEU as a pricing functional
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing for frictionless complete markets enforces a linear
pricing rule: the cost of replication of any security is given by the mathematical expectation of
its payos stream under the unique state contingent price or risk-neutral probability obtained by
the no-arbitrage principle. In a nancial economy where agents can trade a nite and potential
limited number of frictionless securities, the pricing rule gives the minimum cost of getting a
payo equal to (or larger than) a given contingent claim in any state of nature, which is also
known as the super-replication price. Importantly, by no-arbitrage and assuming the presence
of a fair risk-free security, the super-replication price of any security can be determined by its
supremum expected value with respect to all risk-neutral probabilities. Frictions including bid-
ask spreads and indeterminacies of the kind discussed in the previous sections may imply that we
have one more underlying risk-neutral probability and the pricing rule is given by the supremum
of expected values with respect to all these risk-neutral probabilities. As a consequence, the
pricing rule is non-linear and maybe characterized in terms of a capacity.
Subadditive Choquet pricing rules were rst studied and characterized by Chateauneuf et al.
(1996), see also Castagnoli et al. (2002) and Araujo et al. (2012). The main insight of this
approach is that the super-replication price functional derived from a particular arbitrage-free
nancial market can be viewed as a pricing rule represented by a maximum of expected values
over the closure of the set of risk-neutral probabilities. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) extend the
fundamental theorem of nance to markets with frictions. Assuming that the Put-Call Parity
condition holds as well as the absence of arbitrage opportunities they obtain a representation of
the pricing rule as a discounted expectation with respect to a nonadditive risk neutral proba-
bility, i.e., a Choquet capacity. They provide testable conditions under which transaction costs
generate this sublinear pricing rule which is also a Choquet expectation. ? ask the opposite
question: what type of two-period market structure emerges from an arbitrary set of proba-
bilities characterizing a pricing rule? They show that nitely generated pricing rules reveal an
3Other form of informational ineciencies might arise with smooth preferences. Caskey (2009) for instance
shows how asset mis-pricing is consistent with the presence of ambiguity-averse investors of the smooth ambiguity
type.
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ecient complete securities market.
Going beyond the characterization of arbitrage free prices, Beisner and Riedel (2019) study
an equilibrium concept with sublinear prices that they call Knight-Walras equilibrium. They
interpret this sublinear pricing as reecting cautiousness from a market maker who would have an
imprecise probabilistic information about the states of the world, and thus computes the maximal
expected present value over a set of models, so as to hedge uncertainty. They study this notion
of equilibrium and compare it with the more standard notion of Walrasian equilibrium (based
on linear pricing). They prove that Knight-Walras equilibria are generically inecient. In the
particular case of no-aggregate uncertainty, they show that even a small amount of uncertainty
leads to no-trade at a Knight-Walras equilibrium, contrary to what happens at the Walrasian
equilibrium which entails full insurance.
4 Optimal ambiguity sharing
In this section we review optimal ambiguity sharing in CEU and MEU economies. Does the
non-dierentiability in the decision criterion ultimately lead to optimal ambiguity sharing ar-
rangements of a dierent nature than the ones under expected utility? In particular, can we say
that, at the aggregate level, optimal allocations of economies with ambiguity averse agents are
somehow less prone to ambiguity than optimal allocations of economies populated with expected
utility agents?
Chateauneuf et al. (2000) explore the Pareto optimal allocations of a single good economy
populated by CEU maximizers that have the same convex capacity. In this setting, the set of
Pareto optimal allocations is independent of the capacity and, furthermore, is identical to the
set of optima of an economy in which agents are expected utility maximizers and have the same
probability. Hence, optimal allocations are comonotone: optimality dictates that each agent's
allocation is increasing with the aggregate endowment. This in turn "xes" the decision weights
agents use to evaluate their allocation and implies that they are all equal. Thus, the aggregate
implication is not dierent under CEU (with same capacity) and expected utility (with same
probabilistic beliefs). While somewhat surprisingly at rst sight, this result echoes the classical
nding that the Pareto optimal allocations in an expected utility economy do not depend on
the beliefs of the agents as long as they are the same across agents. And indeed, as for the
heterogeneous beliefs in an expected utility economy, things are much more dicult to assess
and characterize when agents have dierent capacities.4
Pareto optimal allocations in a MEU economy has not been fully characterized to the best of
4The relevance of the Pareto criterion in theses cases have been questioned altogether, see Mongin (2016) and
Gilboa et al. (2014).
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our knowledge. Matters are more complicated since comonotonicity of the optimal allocations,
even if it were true under multiple prior hypothesis, does not imply that all agents will have the
same decision weights, except in rather contrived environments (e.g., with only two states of the
world). Epstein (2001) provides an example of risk sharing with dierent ambiguous beliefs in
a two-country example under MEU.
One could wonder why the dierence spotted in the rst section between the optimality
of non exposure to uncertainty that CEU delivers and the "local uncertainty neutrality" of
expected utility agents is not relevant when we look at Pareto optimal allocations. The reason
lies in the simple observation that while a single agent can always choose to shy away from
uncertainty, at the aggregate level, uncertainty must be borne, thus xing decision weights. A
simple Edgeworth box diagram makes the point.
A particular case emerges though, i.e., when it is actually feasible that all agents be fully
insured. This happens in an economy without aggregate uncertainty. In this setting, Billot et al.
(2000), assuming MEU agents (and thus including the convex Choquet case) show that the set
of Pareto optimal allocations consists of the set of full insurance allocations if and only if agents
share at least one prior. This generalizes the expected utility case for which full insurance is
Pareto optimal if and only if agents all have the same probabilistic beliefs.
Rigotti et al. (2008) provide a generalization of this result using a denition of subjective
beliefs (at a given allocation) that applies to any model of convex preferences, based on the
willingness to take small bets when at this allocation. The reasoning that underlies the result in
Billot et al. (2000), based on the MEU model, is thus shown to extend to other models of decision
under uncertainty when there is a multiplicity of "beliefs" supporting an allocation. Strzalecki
and Werner (2011) also extend these results to more general preferences, through the concept
of conditional beliefs. These are the probabilistic beliefs revealed by agents' unwillingness to
take fair bets conditional on an event. They thus show that a necessary and sucient condition
for measurability of Pareto optimal allocations with respect to the aggregate endowment is that
agents have at least one conditional belief in common for every event in the partition induced
by the aggregate endowment. The comonotonicity of consumption plans with the aggregate
endowment requires a stronger condition.
In the CEU case (and still in absence of aggregate risk), considering not necessarily convex
capacities, Billot et al. (2002) provide a characterization of capacities whose cores have a non-
empty intersection and show that if there is a prior that belongs to that intersection, then all
optimal allocations provide full insurance. It may be the case that the cores of the capacities
do not intersect, yet some and even all optimal allocations provide full insurance. Yet, if the
economy is "replicated", i.e., if we consider a continuum of agents of each type, the equivalence
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result is reinstated. Thus, Billot et al. (2002) establish that for large economies populated by
CEU maximizers with possibly non convex capacities, commonality of "beliefs" (in the sense of
the intersection of the cores of the capacities being non empty) is still necessary and sucient
for some, or all Pareto optimal allocations to entail full insurance. Ghirardato and Siniscalchi
(2018) provide the most general analysis so far of the conditions on beliefs and preferences under
which the optimality of full insurance holds in an economy without aggregate uncertainty, that
can in particular accommodate non-convex preferences. Their approach builds on Rigotti et al.
(2008) and identies a notion of an individual's set of local beliefs from his preferences, that
does not require preferences to be overall convex. If these sets have a non-empty intersection,
and in the absence of aggregate uncertainty, Pareto optimal allocations are the full insurance
allocations.
5 Experimental evidence
The individual decision mechanism behind the economic phenomenon we reviewed rests on some
form of non-responsiveness of behavior to a change in prices, which can be traced back to non-
dierentiabilities or kinks in the indierence curves. The experimental literature has provided
some evidence that models including some non-dierentiability like (α)-MEU and CEU are
helpful to explain behavior. As could be expected, heterogeneity is the norm at the individual
level.
Ahn et al. (2014) report the result of an experiment in which subjects had a budget to
split between three Arrow securities whose returns have an Ellsberg three color urn payo
structure. They show that some individuals have a tendency to bunch the two ambiguous
securities, even if they have dierent prices, a prediction consistent with MEU and CEU models.
They however show that this is not the only mode of decision and that some behaviors are more
in line with expected utility or non expected utility smooth models predictions. Baillon and
Bleichrodt (2015) develop an experiment using naturally occurring ambiguous performances of
stock markets, that include gains and losses. They nd that propsect theory and α-maxmin
models can account for the pattern they observe in the data. Cubitt et al. (2018) elaborate a
design specically aimed at discriminating between the MEU and α-MEU family of models on
the one hand and the smooth ambiguity model on the other hand, arguably the most popular
models in applications. They nd clear and statistically signicant patterns in the behavior
of the subjects coded as ambiguity averse that conform more closely to the predictions of the
smooth ambiguity model than to those of the α-MEU model.
Going outside of the lab, Dimmock et al. (2016a) show, on a US representative household
survey, that ambiguity aversion, measured through Ellbserg-type questions is a factor explaining
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non participation in the stock market, in line with the intuition developed by Dow and Werlang
(1992). They also nd a negative relation between the degree of ambiguity aversion and the
fraction of nancial assets allocated to equity. Dimmock et al. (2016b) on the other hand, do
not nd, on a Dutch household survey, that, for the entire sample, ambiguity aversion and
participation are correlated. They do nd that ambiguity aversion is negatively related to stock
market participation, but only for subjects who perceive stock returns as highly ambiguous.
Bianchi and Tallon (2019) provides eld evidence on the relation between ambiguity aversion
and portfolio choices. They show that ambiguity averse investors tend to keep their risk exposure
relatively constant over time. These investors tend to rebalance their portfolio in a contrarian
direction relative to the market. This is in accordance to the phenomenon of portfolio inertia
consistent with the maxmin type of behavior that has been discussed in this note.
Bryan (2019) tests in the eld (through randomized controlled trials in Malawi and Kenya)
the relationship between ambiguity aversion and technology adoption. To raise adoption rate,
it has been suggested to provide insurance to the farmers who adopt these new technologies.
However, theory suggests that insurance will be more eective in areas where the production
technology is well known and will be ineective in promoting take-up of novel technologies among
the ambiguity averse. The reason for this is that partial insurance makes payment conditional
on a specic state of the world, for which objective information that would help to determine the
relevant probabilities is often unavailable, especially when income comes from a new technology.
Thus the value of insurance is ambiguous, and insurance is less useful to those that do not
tolerate ambiguity, that is, the ambiguity averse. As the paper explains, the intuition and
mechanisms of these results is very similar to that of Mukerji and Tallon (2004a) and Mukerji
and Tallon (2004b) showing an endogenous breakdown of trade in markets involving contracts
whose payos are subject to ambiguity. Hence the paper can be seen as an empirical test of
these mechanisms and the model presented a translation of these mechanisms to the particular
setting of agricultural production.
Finally, Bossaerts et al. (2010) go beyond the single agent decision making setting and
present a market experiment in which the assets traded have ambiguous returns. They nd that
ambiguity averse agents will not hold the ambiguous securities at equilibrium, but still have
an impact on their prices. Overall their ndings are in line with predictions from a general
equilibrium model with heterogeneous α-maxmin expected utility agents.
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